The war in Iran arguably constitutes the first full-scale test of the yuan as an international settlement currency.
The share of global oil transactions denominated in dollars has fallen from 70 % in 1999 to 57 % today. It will likely drop below 50 % before 2030, not because the yuan will become the reserve currency, but because Hormuz will have remained a gordian knot long enough, and Trump and Netanyahu will no longer be around.
Today, we are paying mostly today for the mistakes of those who built the global economy on arteries as narrow as they are irreplaceable, without ever foreseeing that one day someone would turn off the tap. That day has arrived. On 4 March 2026, Iran officially closed the Strait of Hormuz[2].
Where 80 to 90 % of trade transits via the oceans, at least two-thirds pass directly or indirectly through seven «chokepoints» whose combined width does not exceed the distance of a Paris-Brussels journey[3]. Ormuz: 34 km. Malacca: 2.7 km. Bab el-Mandeb: 29 km. Suez Canal: 300 m. Bosphorus: 700 m. Panama: 33 m. Taiwan Strait: 130 km[4]. Neither any government nor any international institution has seen fit to seriously build a resilience plan for the day when one of these corridors is cut. The war in Iran is merely the brutal revelation of a collective myopia that the world has maintained for decades.
Major crises always have this function: they awaken the dependencies that periods of stability made invisible.
The war in Ukraine reminded Europe of its dependence on Russian gas and its strategic shortcomings in terms of defence and cohesion; the war in Iran now reveals the fragility of a globalisation built on a few routes, a few energy producers and an American security order that no longer offers the same guarantees.
Just as there was a post-Cold War world and a post-Ukraine world, there will be a post-Iran world. More fragmented, more competitive, and crossed by new forms of economic and technological cold wars. In other words, a truly multipolar world. A Middle East that ceases to be the centre of the world is an additional factor of multipolarisation, directly benefiting the “Global South” and Asian economies that have patiently built their alternatives.
For the ultimate winners of this war will probably not be those who waged it.
The BRICS/BRICS+ group: the real winners
It is the BRICS+ group, with all its internal contradictions, that will emerge as the sole geopolitical structure to have collectively won this war without having exposed itself to it.
By 2026, the group accounts for nearly half of the world's population and around 40 % of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, following the integration of nine new partner states in January 2025. Indonesia brings to the bloc the world's fourth largest population, the largest economy in Southeast Asia (which will encourage others to join), the largest Muslim country on the planet and a highly strategic maritime chokepoint between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.[5].
Their inability to issue a joint press release when member Iran is bombed[6], says it all about what they are: not a military alliance, but a bypass platform, allowing each to reduce its dependence on American sanctions, the dollar, and the diplomatic hierarchies inherited from the 20th century. The war in Iran offers them an unexpected acceleration.
China is the textbook example of the winner without a uniform
She loses access to Iranian oil transported by phantom routes (15 % of her total imports)[7], but wins on all other counts. Co-signatory of the peace plan with Pakistan, guarantor of the security of the Iranian delegates in Islamabad, 25 % shareholder in Guyanese oil which replaces Gulf crude in Asia while Hormuz is closed[8], and co-architect of Power of Siberia 2 (a giant gas pipeline project intended to connect Western Siberia and northern China), the first mention of which appears in the Chinese five-year plan of March 2026. And while Europe is imposing tariffs of 45 % on Chinese electric vehicles, BYD is opening a factory in Szeged, Hungary, capable of producing 150,000 electric vehicles a year from 2026[9], bypassing taxes from within the single market itself. This strategy will allow China to slash European market prices to 20,000–25,000 euros per electric vehicle (vs 35,000 euros for European equivalents and 38,000 euros for Tesla), reinforcing a trade surplus already exceeding 360 billion with the EU[10].
Russia, for its part, wins effortlessly
Urals crude rose from less than $55 before the war to about $115 in March, which is nearly $9 billion in extra revenue per month[11]. Each day that Hormuz remains closed strengthens its position as an alternative supplier. Exports to India have doubled[12]. This country, which imports 60% of its crude oil and 40 % of its urea and phosphate from the Middle East, is exposed through its 10 million workers in the Gulf who generate 125 billion dollars in annual revenue.[13], will attempt to secure long-term Russian oil contracts in rupees. This war is pushing New Delhi, the country most affected outside the MENA region, towards a pragmatic de-dollarisation that it would never have politically undertaken under normal circumstances. And Trump, caught between his sanctions and the need to avoid an electoral shock, is granting Moscow a 30-day waiver allowing countries to buy sanctioned Russian oil[14] – obtaining without negotiation what two years of diplomacy had failed to secure.
All indications are that Russia will use this oil windfall (March-September 2026) to replenish its foreign currency reserves and launch a renewed offensive in Ukraine before winter, taking advantage of Western distraction and the slowdown in arms deliveries to Kyiv, which are themselves slowed down by order backlogs linked to the Iranian conflict. Two wars. One winner.
Who benefits the most from this war? Moscow. Who is getting sanctions on its oil relaxed? Moscow. Who is seeing its exports to India and China explode? Moscow again. The myth of Russian influence over Trump has never seemed so well-supported by the facts.
Pakistan: master of a new «Sunni NATO»?
Islamabad could join BRICS
For several years, but its entry had until now been blocked by India. In the post-pandemic world, nothing is certain any longer. Backed by Beijing via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), useful to Riyadh and Ankara (the agreement signed), able to speak to Tehran for twenty years, a historic security partner of the United States and the only Muslim nuclear power, Pakistan has become too central to be ignored.
He is today the only actor capable of holding these four threads simultaneously. In the longer term, Islamabad could extend its role as security guarantor to the other Gulf states.
Acting both as a conduit for the “Global South” and a major Muslim voice (the second-largest Muslim population in the world with 240 million believers), Pakistan has gone from being on the verge of bankruptcy in 2023 ($44 billion of IMF debt) to negotiating an eagerly awaited Iran-US ceasefire. By 2027–2028, it could obtain enhanced strategic partner status; a first step towards full membership if the balance of power with India eases or if China enforces it.
An economic fragility that reinforces its diplomatic value
By the end of 2027, Islamabad could secure a second debt relief package from the IMF and preferential access to the US market for its textile and agricultural exports. However, this trajectory should not obscure a harsher reality. With a debt exceeding 70 % of GDP[15], its neutrality is dictated by constraint. Paradoxically, it is this fragility that reinforces its diplomatic value (a Pakistan that was too powerful would no longer be accepted by everyone as an intermediary).
China now accounts for 82 % of Pakistan’s arms imports (compared with 50 % ten years earlier)[16], with proven effectiveness against India during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Pakistan will no longer be merely a customer but a co-developer and exporter of armaments for the Islamic world – a position already illustrated by the 4.6 billion dollar contract signed between China and Azerbaijan for fighter jets[17]. A direction Turkey covets, but which Pakistani-Chinese convergence is currently contesting.
The Gulf Cooperation Council ceases to be the centre of the world
On 29 April 2026, the United Arab Emirates announces its withdrawal from OPEC, effective 1 May, as Gulf exporters can no longer ship a single barrel through Hormuz[18]. And for good reason: Abu Dhabi, the cartel's third-largest producer, had invested 150 billion dollars to increase its capacity to 4.85 million barrels a day, but remained constrained by the OPEC+ quota of 3.4 million, leaving 30 % of its capacity unused while Iraq and Russia cheated with impunity on their own ceilings[19]. This departure will trigger a phase of gradual disintegration of the cartel, weakening its ability to control the markets and paving the way for increased competition amongst producers. With the UAE’s withdrawal, 15 % will be lost. Sharp falls in prices are to be expected. OPEC will once again become a political forum rather than an effective cartel.
On paper, Abu Dhabi says it wants to produce at full capacity and sell without restriction. Beyond the unprecedented cost of the Iranian attacks, the Emirates above all have no intention of remaining in a cartel where Tehran still sits as a member. The UAE now intends to route more oil directly to Israel, which has become its number one strategic ally. Ultimately, this withdrawal from OPEC is the most direct proof of the irreversible choice of
UAE: Israel rather than Saudi Arabia[20].
To understand this turning point, we must retrace the thread of a long-standing rift. Riyadh gradually watched its neighbour support, by proxy, actors whose objectives directly clashed with its priorities. Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa… but it was Yemen that was the straw that broke the camel's back. Emirati support for southern separatist forces compromised Riyadh's objective of restoring a unified Yemeni state under its aegis.[21]. Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), who once saw Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) as a mentor, now regards him as a rival. The two men are too different ideologically and geopolitically. It was bound to erupt sooner or later. The war in Iran will merely be the catalyst. In future, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will each seek to aggregate their own spheres of influence around themselves in the Arab world. The GCC will never be the same bloc again.
War does not just destroy bases and lives. It destroys a narrative. For 30 years, the Emirates worked tirelessly to sell the opposite idea of the Middle East: security, modernity and abundance. It took just a few weeks for this golden era to shatter. The Dubai index has lost 20 % since 28 February.[22]. Goldman Sachs sees property transactions plummet by 37 % year-on-year and 49 % month-on-month, with discounts of 15 % on certain Palm Jumeirah properties.[23],[24]. This crisis of confidence will take longer to overcome than the physical damage itself, and the capital and talent that have left since February will not return before a whole generation has forgotten March 2026. Following the resumption of Iranian strikes on 4 May[25], let us not rule out the possibility of Abu Dhabi taking the step of a symbolic direct retaliation against Tehran, at the risk of worsening the haemorrhage it is trying to contain.
Iranian boldness relegates the United States to the sidelines in the Gulf
For the first time, Iran has attacked all six GCC members jointly, punishing them with a clear message: any country that has hosted an American command is a legitimate target[26]. The Gulf countries are simultaneously angry with Iran, which struck them, and with the United States, whose presence was supposed to be a guarantee. It is in this context that we must view the issue of the trillion dollars that MBS had promised with great fanfare at the White House.[27]. These mega-promises will, at best, be halved and made conditional, and at worst, purely cancelled. MBS has one lever: money. Moreover, Riyadh has already sent a signal by signing a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan in September 2025.[28]. The Saudi-US relationship risks entering a transactional phase of unprecedented severity.
Saudi Arabia on the front line to rebuild, could join BRICS
Riyadh will not normalise relations with Israel, at least not while Netanyahu remains in power and no visible concessions are made on Gaza. The war serves as a reminder to MBS that normalisation is an imperfect guarantee and a definite vulnerability. Instead, Riyadh will seek to become the political centre of the Arab world once again by financing the reconstruction of Gaza, at a time when neither a weakened Iran nor a pressured Qatar will be in a position to be the primary donors. If Saudi Arabia allows Turkey to capture this narrative, Ankara will snatch the Arab centrality that Riyadh has claimed for decades. Gaza is becoming the sole arena where MBS can redeem his pan-Arab legitimacy. And to anchor this position, Saudi Arabia will dust off a forty-year-old project – its 1,200 km East-West pipeline to the Red Sea to bypass Hormuz.[29]. A pipeline that Saddam Hussein once forced Riyadh to close in 1990[30]. History, sometimes, offers second chances.
We anticipate that Saudi Arabia will formalise its membership of the BRICS by 2028. Invited since 2023, having cancelled at the last moment in 2025, Riyadh has maintained a wait-and-see stance[31]. The entry of the world's largest oil producer into the club of 21st-century non-aligned nations, likely dragging Bahrain and Qatar in its wake, will constitute the founding act of a genuinely multipolar order. Riyadh will not choose Beijing over Washington. It will choose never to depend on a single protector again. Neither black nor white. Grey.
Bahrain and Kuwait tread carefully
They absorbed an even more brutally disproportionate level of violence than their neighbours[32]. Bahrain could withdraw from the Abraham Accords – too dependent on Riyadh, too exposed to Iran, too internally fragile to bear alone a symbolic cost that its Saudi sponsor has not yet agreed to pay. The most credible hypothesis is not a dramatic exit but a discreet withdrawal, orchestrated to refocus what remains of the GCC without the UAE. Kuwait, for its part, will reinforce its cautious and non-aligned stance.
Qatar: return to grace with Saudi Arabia
There is something ironically logical about this reconfiguration of the Gulf. Qatar, which Riyadh had tried to isolate completely for three and a half years between 2017 and 2021[33], is in the position of a necessary partner today. Ras Laffan, the world's largest gas platform, suffered damage estimated to take 5 years to repair and a loss of 17 % of its LNG export capacity[34]. Doha needs Saudi land corridors to bypass Hormuz and gain access to the Red Sea. Riyadh needs Qatari diplomatic legitimacy with Tehran and regional Muslim Brotherhood networks. A form of forced rapprochement will take place between the two countries, less out of conviction than mutual necessity. It is a marriage of convenience between two former enemies that the war will make inevitable.
Muscat is going to consolidate its position as the «Geneva of the Middle East» for the next ten years
Oman: the great overlooked and the great winner of the GCC. The sultanate, the least affected despite its ports hosting American facilities, owes its being spared to a neutrality built on 40 years of diplomatic consistency. Oman has assets: maritime access outside Hormuz via Sohar and Salalah, and credibility with both Iran and the West[35]. , courted by Washington, Beijing and Tehran. Oman is going to monetise its geography like never before. Alongside Islamabad, Muscat will be one of the two essential mediation hubs of the Arab world. The GCC as we once knew it is a thing of the past. A new Gulf will emerge, more divided, more suspicious, and paradoxically more open to multiple external alignments. What comes next does not yet have a name. But it begins now.
As you leave the Gulf, the routes redirect towards Africa
A few weeks are enough for sea charts to change their meaning.
Since the Houthis closed Bab el-Mandeb last year, Cape Town and Durban have seen their transit traffic and port revenues increase. The Cape of Good Hope, a backup route since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869[36], is returning to a role it hasn't held for a hundred and fifty years. This detour lengthens journeys by 10-15 days and increases transport costs by 30 to 50 %[37], but it offers something the Gulf no longer guarantees: security. Up to 15 % of the Asia-Europe traffic could permanently pass via the Cape, compared to less than 5 % before 2023. Pretoria would then negotiate massive port modernisation agreements with China, India and the EU to capture this new maritime revenue and raise the toll.
Mohammed VI, visionary regarding Tanger Med
Twenty years ago, Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, launched Tanger Med[38]. The project seemed oversized for a country of 37 million inhabitants with no maritime tradition. Today, Tanger Med is connected to 180 ports in 70 countries and handles volumes comparable to major European hubs.[39].And the war in Iran has just validated this vision. Morocco controls the southern flank of the Strait of Gibraltar, the only maritime passage between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to have remained entirely open since the Strait of Hormuz crisis[40]. Rabat has already thought ahead: Nador West Med will open at the end of 2026 with a capacity of 5 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) and Morocco's first LNG terminal; and Dakhla Atlantique will follow with a scheduled opening in 2028-2029 with an annual capacity of 35 million tonnes.[41]. CMA CGM has already signed an agreement guaranteeing 3 million containers a year for Nador[42]. Finally, the 5,800 km Nigeria-Morocco pipeline (the world's longest offshore gas pipeline, if completed) could transport some sub-Saharan African gas to Europe via the kingdom, entirely bypassing the Gulf. Morocco has the potential to establish itself as the main energy and transit hub for Europe-Africa-Americas trade – a role that Dubai played for the Middle East.
Algeria is formally identified by the IMF as one of the «winners» of the Iranian conflict
Its gas exports to Europe increased by 22 % in January 2026[43]. Italy and Spain landed in Algiers within 24 hours of each other in March to secure gas via the Transmed (to Italy) and Medgaz (to Spain) pipelines.[44].Algeria was already supplying 39-40 billion cubic metres of gas to the EU in 2025, or 1/6 of total imports[45] and has a window of 18 to 24 months to impose favourable terms before European renewables reduce demand.
Long marginalised, Libya is getting back in the game by awarding its oil and gas blocks to major foreign companies (Eni, Chevron, QatarEnergy), a first in twenty years. When needs must, Europeans know how to forget. The pipeline from the Farigh field to the Mediterranean was in the testing phase at the beginning of March. This pipeline will soon be in commercial service, making Libya Europe's third-largest gas supplier. Once again, the war in Iran will be the catalyst for Euro-African energy integration that twenty years of European neighbourhood policy had failed to bring about.
The blind spots of this multipolarisation of the world: what prospects for evolution?
True to our approach, let us look where no one else is looking.
Acceleration of civil nuclear power in Japan and South Korea
Qatar produces 35 % of the world's helium[46], an invisible yet critical resource for semiconductor manufacturing: it cools silicon wafers during production, prevents parasitic chemical reactions, and is used in MRIs and aerospace research. The strike on Ras Laffan caused prices to skyrocket immediately, jumping from $300 to $600 or even $900 per thousand cubic feet.
South Korea, the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductors alongside Taiwan, imported 65 % of its helium from Qatar in 2024[47], while its energy supplies rely on the same routes which are now under strain. Japan, for its part, had to release 80 million barrels from its reserves on 16 March, equivalent to 15 days of national consumption[48]. Same problem means identical response. These two countries are going to converge towards an accelerated return to civil nuclear power. Japan has restarted 12 reactors since 2022[49] ; 8 more could be by 2028, marking a post-Fukushima turning point. Seoul, which has already built 4 reactors in the Emirates[50], will capitalise on the Gulf's energy panic to establish itself as the global vendor of reactors.
What are the alternatives?
Tanzania and Poland, with unexploited helium deposits[51], will attract massive investment by 2027, while tech giants Samsung, TSMC and ASML are going to accelerate their helium consumption reduction programmes in manufacturing processes, anticipating that reliance on a single source is a strategic risk. This war will indirectly force constrained innovation.
Global food prices, already under pressure, are set to rise between now and the autumn 2027 harvest
Probably the most dangerous shock, partly because it is delayed. The Gulf accounts for 30 % of global urea exports, 20 to 30 % of ammonia and 50 % of sulphur flows.[52] ; all of which are inputs needed for fertilisers. Since the start of the conflict, fertiliser prices have already risen by 40 %, with projections that they could double for nitrogen[53]. The real impact of the fertiliser shock will probably materialise next year, during the spring planting.
The UN World Food Programme has already warned of a scenario similar to the 2007-2008 food crisis. This shock will therefore hit the most import-dependent areas first. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as several Asian economies (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia or Sri Lanka) already weakened by price-related riots, will see new waves of unrest by 2028. In these countries, where food accounts for 50% of the household budget, even a marginal rise in prices acts as an immediate trigger.
The war in Iran is not only driving up the price of oil; it is making the simple act of getting around more expensive
Marine insurance premiums surged by over 1,000%, rising from around 0.25% to nearly 3% of the value of the vessels[54]. On a tanker worth 200 to 300 million dollars, this represents up to 7.5 million for a single journey. Nearly 25 billion dollars' worth of cargo remains exposed in the area. Iran is turning its vulnerability into a tax on global trade. For the most daring, Iran is offering a toll of 2 million euros for any ship wishing to pass through Hormuz... unless it belongs to a Russian oligarch, a friend of Putin[55]. The global insurance market, maritime security companies and risk consultancies will all experience growth, driven by the multiplication of grey zones.
Europe, different wars, same mistakes, and now?
Third energy crisis in four years, and Europe still hasn't learned from its mistakes.
In 2022, it depended on Russian gas for 40 % and had no exit plan. By 2026, it is rushing towards US LNG, which now accounts for 64% of its imports.[56]. That’s too much. In March, the closure of Ras Laffan sent the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) soaring above €60/MWh, with reserves falling to 30 % – a five-year low[57]. All Europe has done is replace one dependency with another, without addressing its vulnerability to external shocks. Europe has no plan B for Hormuz, just as it had no plan B for Russian gas in 2022. The problem is no longer cyclical, it is structural.
This crisis also reveals an internal fracture, which says everything about what Europe should have done
Whilst in Spain gas sets the price of electricity for only 15 % of the hours in 2026 thanks to the meteoric rise of renewables, in Italy this figure reaches 90 %[58]. Same external shock, two economic realities. Italy and Germany, whose steel and chemical industrialists have imposed 30 % surcharges on their customers, are on the brink of a technical recession.
In 2022, the war in Ukraine triggered an unprecedented wave of investment in European renewables. Countries that achieve 50 % renewables in their energy mix will be immune to the next Strait of Hormuz shock. Currently, only a few economies are on this positive trajectory: Spain, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, and Scotland.
For an Atlantic LNG terminal
Now for a few insights! Portugal has the longest Atlantic coastline in continental Europe, whilst Spain has the continent's largest regasification capacity at 34 billion cubic metres per year.[59] – but is connected to France by only two small, saturated gas pipelines. It is the most absurd missing link in European energy geography. If the EU finances the Iberian interconnection by 2028, it will de facto create a shared Atlantic LNG terminal capable of supplying Germany and Italy without passing through Eastern routes or depending on the Gulf. We anticipate that by 2030, the Iberian corridor, Lisbon-Madrid-Bilbao, will become Europe's main energy gateway from the Atlantic. The war in Iran will have cost Europe hundreds of billions. The Iberian interconnection would likely cost only five.
What this war tells us about the next one
The history of wars is also the history of what they reveal.
Fifty-five kilometres of strait were enough to make the global economic machine wobble. A drained country held the planet's foremost military power hostage. What is certain is that the initial miscalculation—the idea that decapitating a regime is enough to make it fall—will haunt Washington and Tel Aviv for years to come. Meanwhile, Russia was waiting for prices to rise. China let dependencies speak for themselves. Sun Tzu already wrote that «the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting».
A redistribution of roles and power
Thanks to this war, a country that was bankrupt in 2023 will by 2028 be one of the most sought-after diplomatic players in the world, with a view to creating a Sunni NATO. A sultanate that nobody looked at is becoming the Geneva of the Middle East. A Maghrebi kingdom is pulling off the gamble of its life. A landlocked East African country suddenly sees its helium deposits become a strategic raw material for global semiconductors. A sixty-year-old oil cartel is beginning to die. A nation that used to build nuclear reactors for others is starting to order them for itself. And somewhere, a power that hasn't fired a single missile is pocketing nine billion dollars a month. «Small» players will become «large» and alliances will form in the shadow of new dependencies.
It is these silent, structural angles that are shaping the world of tomorrow
[1] Source: Amin Maalouf, The Disoriented, 2012
[2] Source: Wikipedia, 04/05/2026
[3] Source: Anadolu Agency, 10/03/2026
[4] Source: Logistics Middle East, 13/04/2026
[5] Source: The grand continent, 02/01/2025
[6] Source: Foreign Policy, 16/03/2026
[7] Source: Les Echos, 13/04/2026
[9] Source: Car info, 13/04/2026
[10] Source: Le Point, 19/02/2026
[11] Source: Reuters, 27/04/2026
[12] Source: BFM TV, 27/04/2026
[13] Source: BFM TV 02/03/2026
[14] Source: Euronews, 13/03/2026
[15] Source: Directorate-General of the Treasury, 2026
[16] Source: Armaments Observatory, 08/03/2026
[17] Source: Avianews, 09/06/2025
[18] Source: Al Jazeera, 29/04/2026
[19] Source: TV5 Monde, 29/04/2026
[20] Source: L’Orient-Le-Jour, 30/12/2025
[22] Source: Agefi, 16/03/2026
[23] Source: Reuters, 03/03/2026
[24] Source: Goldman Sachs, 23/03/206
[25] Source: Les Echos, 5/05/2026
[26] Source: France Info, 10/03/2026
[27] Source: France24, 18/11/2025
[28] Source: Le Monde, 18/09/2025
[29] Source: Arab News, 01/04/2026
[30] Source: L’Opinion, 16/03/2026
[31] Source: Geoconfluences, 04/12/2025
[32] Source: Courrier International, 01/03/2026
[33] Source: Le Monde, 05/01/2021
[34] Source: Les Echos, 19/03/2026
[35] Source: Le temps, 03/05/2026
[36] Source: National Geographic, 19/09/2025
[37] Source: Van report, 09/01/2025
[38] Source: Hespress, 09/06/2025
[39] Source: North Africa post, 13/03/2026
[40] Source: Atalayar, 02/04/2026
[41] Source: Reuters, 08/12/2025
[42] Source: Medias 24, 11/11/2025
[44] Source: La Croix, 02/04/2026
[46] Source: Usine Nouvelle, 07/04/2026
[47] Source: Le Monde, 12/03/2026
[48] Source: Foreign Policy, 09/04/2026
[49] Source: Nippon, 20/08/2022
[52] Source: Agence Ecofin, 18/03/2026
[53] Source: DG Tresor, 13/03/2026
[54] Source: Reuters, 28/04/2026
[55] Source: Ouest France, 24/03/2026
[56] Source: National Interest, 07/04/2026
[57] Source: Wikipedia, 28/04/2026
[58] Source: PV Magazine, 18/03/2026
[59] Source: Revue Conflits, 22/04/2026
French 
English 
Chinese 
Arabic