Right on the march: the continent's new fault lines
A new wind is blowing across Europe — but it is not always one of hope. From the capitals of the East to those of the West, the same trend is taking hold: the irresistible rise of the radical right. In Bucharest, Lisbon, Berlin or Vienna, these parties, long relegated to the margins, are gaining ground, entering parliaments, influencing governments and forcing their themes to the heart of public debate. This upheaval is no longer an exception: it is a shift.
Why do these voices of withdrawal appeal so much? How do they turn fear into a political project? And above all, what does this conservative wave say about Europe's relationship with its past, its borders, and its future?
At a time when the continent is seeking a balance between memory, identity and openness to the world, it is becoming urgent to understand the drivers of a recomposition that is silently yet profoundly reshaping the face of European democracy.
The major trends in the rise of the radical right in Europe
Once a symbol of moderation and pluralist dialogue, Europe is going through a period of political upheaval in which the radical right, long relegated to the fringes of public debate, is establishing itself as a structuring force. From local ballots to national elections, this movement is reshaping the balance of power on the Old Continent, challenging democratic traditions and shaking up ideological certainties.
This surge, far from being uniform, adapts to national particularities while sharing common themes: rejection of the elites, identity defensiveness and criticism of European integration.
Eastern Europe:
- Romania: The AUR party, combining sovereignism and social conservatism, won 46 % of the vote in the second round of the 2023 presidential election, shaking up a political establishment historically rooted in Atlanticism.
- Poland: The Confederation coalition (far-right) is polling over 20 %, challenging PiS (nationalist right) on its own ground.
– Hungary: In power since 2010, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party (officially conservative) has institutionalised an ethnic nationalist ideology, restricting public liberties and promoting an «illiberal democracy» centred on Christian identity.
Southern Europe:
- Portugal: The Chega party, founded in 2019, made a meteoric breakthrough by becoming the third political force in the 2024 legislative elections, with 18 % of the vote.
– Italy: Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, driven by an anti-immigration and traditionalist agenda, has led the government since 2022, embodying a normalisation of the far right within the EU.
- Spain: Vox, an ultra-nationalist party, established itself as the third force in the 2023 elections (12 %), influencing the traditional PP right towards harder positions on Catalonia and immigration.
Northern and Western Europe:
- Germany: In the federal elections on 23 February, the AfD (Alternative f r Deutschland) confirmed its stronghold by winning 20.8 % of the vote, becoming the country's second-largest political force. In the five eastern L%e nders, it became the leading political force. The centre-right CDU/CSU, now facing competition on its right, is hardening its rhetoric on immigration and security.
– Netherlands: Winner of the November 2023 general election, Geert Wilders« PVV formed a minority government in June 2024 with the VVD (conservative liberals) and the BBB (agrarians), despite its anti-Islam and Eurosceptic positions. For the first time, the far right has come to power. Wilders, a central figure in the coalition, has put his »anti-Quran law" project on hold to reassure his partners, with external support from the NSC (centre-right).
– Sweden: Rooted in 1990s neo-Nazi origins, the Sweden Democrats (SD, far right) have since 2022 supported a centre-right minority government without participating in it directly. Having become the second-largest political force, they strongly influence migration and security policies, imposing restrictive laws such as the limitation of family reunification. This alliance tarnishes the progressive image of the Swedish model.
– Belgium: The Vlaams Belang (VB), a far-right Flemish nationalist party, consolidated its influence in the June 2024 elections, reaching 23 % in Flanders and becoming the second largest regional political force. It is shaping debates on immigration and Flemish autonomy, pushing traditional parties to harden their positions.
– France: Following the 2025 legislative elections, the National Rally (RN) became the leading force in the National Assembly, disrupting the institutional balance. Unavoidable, it is influencing the formation of the government and imposing its priorities (immigration, security, national identity), relying on a massive foothold in rural areas, peri-urban areas and medium-sized towns.
The consequences are profound:
– Erosion of the moderates: Historic parties (Social Democrats, Christian Democrats) continue their decline in many European countries. In Finland, the Finns Party (far-right) has been shaping government policy since 2023. In Austria, the FPÖ won the early general election in spring 2025, establishing itself as the leading political force and hardening the debate on immigration and national identity.
– Polarisation and fragmentation: Parliaments are dividing into antagonistic blocs, complicating the formation of majorities. In Denmark, the Danish People's Party pushed the government to adopt Europe's strictest migration laws, without even being in power.
– Normalisation of illiberalism: Anti-EU rhetoric is gaining legitimacy. Hungary and Robert Fico's Slovakia are now blocking EU decisions on aid to Ukraine or asylum.
This political metamorphosis calls into question the very future of the European project. Caught between the temptation of withdrawal and democratic resilience, Europe must reinvent a common narrative capable of reconciling national sovereignty and cooperation, pluralism and social cohesion. The response to this challenge will determine whether the Old Continent remains a laboratory of democracy or sinks into identity fractures.
Far-Right Discourse and Strategies: Fear, Identity and Manipulation
The European far right articulates its discourse and strategies around two main pillars: the instrumentalisation of the fear of immigration and the promotion of an exclusive national identity, all amplified by emotional manipulation tactics.
Immigration as an existential threat and ideological cement: At the heart of the rhetoric lies the presentation of immigration as an existential threat. Parties such as AUR (Romania), Chega (Portugal) and the AfD (Germany) conflate immigration, crime, unemployment and cultural decline, fuelling an anxiety-inducing narrative via punchy slogans («Our country, our rules») and images of «invaded» borders. The conspiracy theory of the «great replacement», widely disseminated in particular on social media, serves to simplify complex crises (economic, identity-based) into a so-called «invasion» that must be fought. This instrumentalisation transforms the fear of the Other into a powerful ideological cement, uniting a vulnerable electorate around a simplistic response to challenges that are nonetheless multidimensional.
An exclusive national identity as a shield : Faced with this manufactured threat, the far right is forging and defending a closed and idealised vision of national identity.
It contrasts a «pure people» — defined as the guardian of traditions and security — both with «disconnected elites» accused of betrayal and with «threatening foreigners». Movements such as the Austrian FPÖ and the Dutch PVV appropriate national symbols (flags, historical heritage) and cultivate an orchestrated nostalgia («traditional» families, past greatness) to embody this fantasised nation. Simultaneously, minorities are designated as scapegoats responsible for society's ills. This Manichaean dualism — «us versus them» — brutally polarises public debate, replacing dialogue with confrontation.
Manipulation tactics to amplify fear : To spread this discourse and mobilise their base, these parties resort to specific tactics aimed at manipulating emotions and amplifying the sense of fear:
1. Viral emotions: The use of simplistic, hard-hitting slogans («Let's save Europe»), shocking videos and a massive presence on social media makes it possible to bypass traditional media and rapidly spread messages based on fear and anger.
2. Manufactured apocalypse The dissemination of doomsday scenarios («imminent invasion») and the use of alarmist figures, often taken out of context, maintain a permanent sense of urgency aimed at influencing the political and media agenda.
3. Narrative warfare: By systematically accusing established media and those in government of «lying» or «hiding the truth», these parties position themselves as the sole authentic defenders of «real citizens». This strategy aims to drive a deep wedge of distrust between an «us» (the people) and a «them» (the elites, foreigners), thereby delegitimising any criticism or contradictory analysis.
Deep roots: economic unease, identity quest and institutional distrust
Deep roots: economic unease, identity quest and institutional distrust
Material insecurity: a fertile breeding ground
Since 2008, successive economic crises (pandemic, geopolitical tensions) have exacerbated insecurity. Inflation, hardship and the decline of the middle classes are fuelling a sense of abandonment, especially in rural and peri-urban areas. Faced with this anxiety, radical parties are promising protection, borders and a restored economic order, contrasting with the perceived powerlessness of traditional parties.
Identity in crisis: globalisation and nostalgia
Globalisation and cultural diversity are experienced as threats to national cohesion.
Immigration is becoming the symbol of cultural dilution, against which the far right proposes a return to a «pure» identity. This narrative reassures an electorate in search of reference points, championing a nostalgia for the past and a fixed vision of the nation.
Decline in trust in institutions
Political scandals, technocracy and the disconnection of the elites have undermined the legitimacy of traditional parties. The failure of governments to manage crises (migratory, health) has reinforced the perception of an unfair system. The far right is capitalising on this distrust, presenting itself as the only credible alternative, capable of making a radical break with the status quo.
Impacts on the political landscape and society
Impacts on the political landscape and society
Shift to the right of public debate and policies
The far right's breakthrough has shifted public debate towards security and identity themes. Immigration, once approached with nuance, now dominates the agenda, leading to stricter laws (heightened checks, restrictions on social rights). Traditional parties, to avoid losing votes, are adopting these subjects, normalising a rhetoric based on fear. As a result, moderate positions are fading, replaced by a binary divide between «protectionists» and «progressists», eroding democratic dialogue.
Social fractures and institutional fragility
Socially, the stigmatisation of migrants and minorities is intensifying, fueling community tensions and identity withdrawal. Hate speech, now unashamedly relayed, is normalising exclusion.
At an institutional level, instability is growing: fragile coalitions, unmanageable majorities. In some countries (Sweden, Italy), moderate parties depend on the far right to govern, legitimising its ideas. This dynamic undermines checks and balances (independent media, the judiciary) and threatens pluralism, weakening the very foundations of European democracies.
Europe in the mirror of its contradictions – Memory, survival and fragile balances
The rise of the far right in Europe reflects less a national retreat than a crisis of globalisation, torn between unavoidable interdependencies and the temptation of rejection.
This paradox offends the memory of a Europe rebuilt after 1945 by foreign workers — Italians, Turks, North Africans — whose toil drove the continent's economic momentum. To this day, an ageing Europe relies on these «foreign hands», which it stigmatises while depending on them.
Ignoring this reality is not only morally questionable, it is a strategic error. As Africa prepares to become a demographic giant and Asia leads in innovation, a Europe that turns in on itself risks isolation. Populisms, by cultivating the fear of the other, forget that civilisations collapse less from invasion than from a refusal of the world.
The issue is not to pit openness against identity, but to combine memory and lucidity. Europe's future lies in its capacity to remain a bridge — not a fortress.
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