The likely return of targeted assassinations against the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran

By April 2025, Israel had already drawn up plans for attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Their implementation, however, required American logistical support. Donald Trump had then chosen to hold back his Israeli allies and to favour the opening of negotiations with Tehran.

An investigation by New York Times, conducted by several journalists specialising in security issues, then revealed deep divisions within the US administration.

On one side, proponents of a hard line towards Iran; on the other, those who defended a new diplomatic attempt. The compromise eventually found was fragile, but it led Washington to rule out, for the time being, direct military action.

However, this decision did not mean that the other options had been abandoned. Following Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington, Trump had sent CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Jerusalem. There, he had met the Israeli Prime Minister as well as David Barnea, then Director of the Mossad. The aim was to examine the various options available regarding Tehran, ranging from conventional military action to Israeli clandestine operations with potential American support, as well as the reinforcement of economic sanctions.

At the time, a National Security Council spokesperson had summed up the US administration's position, reiterating that Iran could under no circumstances obtain a nuclear weapon, that all options remained open, and that the possibility of direct or indirect talks would not be unlimited.

A few weeks later, Israel launched an attack of unprecedented scale in the heart of Tehran. The so-called «twelve-day war», in June 2025, was to result in particular in the deaths of several commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and scientists linked to the Iranian nuclear programme.

With hindsight, the sequence of events therefore seems quite clear. A phase of diplomatic stalling, discreet coordination between the intelligence services, followed by action.

A year later, certain elements are strangely reminiscent of that sequence.

Following the ceasefire agreed in April 2026, fighting resumed in early July. Talks on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme have once again stalled. In early August, Tehran even went so far as to deny that it was engaged in direct talks with Washington, whilst US officials claimed that an agreement was close.

It was in this context that the meeting took place in July between Roman Gofman, appointed head of the Mossad, and John Ratcliffe. According to Axios, this was Gofman's first trip to Washington since taking up his duties in June.

The meeting, which was also attended by several senior White House officials, was officially intended to coordinate the US and Israeli positions ahead of further talks on a nuclear deal.

However, the context of this meeting is particularly important. Ratcliffe is among the American officials most sceptical about the memorandum of understanding concluded with Iran.

He is particularly concerned that Tehran might interpret it differently from Washington, especially regarding the provisions concerning the Strait of Hormuz.

This meeting took place shortly before a fresh escalation around the strait and the resumption of large-scale fighting. The chronology is therefore reminiscent of that of 2025. Blocked negotiations, a discreet meeting between the heads of the American and Israeli intelligence services, followed by a new rise in tensions.

In my view, this meeting needs to be taken seriously in light of the 2025 precedent. High-level contacts between the US and Israeli intelligence apparatuses have previously coincided with major security developments inside Iran itself.

Several recent developments also lend weight to the theory that the conflict is shifting towards more covert forms of action. Direct military confrontation is, in fact, becoming increasingly costly for both sides. It does not lead to a clear resolution.

On the Jordanian front, an Iranian ballistic missile attack targeted the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, which hosts US forces, on 18 July 2026. Two US service members were killed there. This brings the total number of US soldiers killed since hostilities resumed two weeks prior to sixteen.

In Yemen, the Houthis, allies of Tehran, have simultaneously stepped up their attacks on Saudi Aramco’s oil infrastructure. Since the end of July, the Jizan refineries and the Yanbu export terminal have been targeted in particular. Yanbu has taken on particular importance since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, becoming the main route for the export of Saudi oil. On 9 August, the Houthis once again claimed responsibility for an attack on the Jizan site.

These attacks on Saudi infrastructure demonstrate that Tehran retains the capacity to exert pressure beyond the Iranian theatre. They also reflect a shift in the balance of power.

At the same time, the United States and Israel are facing a difficulty: the conventional military option is costly and does not appear, on its own, to offer a way out of the impasse.

That is why Washington and Jerusalem might be tempted to favour other instruments: political pressure, intelligence, clandestine operations and targeted actions. In this scenario, the elimination of key regime officials, accompanied by an attempt to exploit Iran's internal vulnerabilities, could regain a central place in American and Israeli strategy.

Another element seems particularly important and remains relatively absent from analyses focused solely on the choice between war and negotiation: the presumed existence of a «coup d'état network».

The Leader of the Revolution, who was assassinated whilst delivering his final public speeches, had himself alluded to the existence of this network. It has never been formally uncovered or neutralised within Iran’s sensitive institutions. If it still exists, its presence would constitute a further source of vulnerability for the regime.

This hypothesis deserves all the more attention given that Iran has already proved vulnerable to infiltration, sabotage and intelligence operations. In these circumstances, a strategy based on penetrating the regime’s structures and eliminating high-profile targets.

He could appear, to his opponents, as an alternative to an open confrontation.

The last two decades have shown just how vulnerable the Islamic Republic can be in the intelligence war and in what is known as the «grey zone». Israel’s campaigns of sabotage and assassinations against Iran are the most obvious illustration of this.

Even if the negotiations were ultimately to result in a compromise — allowing Iran, in particular, to retain some of its enrichment capacity in exchange for economic concessions — there is no guarantee that this shadow war would come to an end.

One of Tehran's persistent weaknesses lies precisely in the absence of a genuine deterrence doctrine in this grey zone. The regime has shown that it can respond militarily to certain attacks, but that it is less capable of preventing infiltrations, sabotage and targeted operations carried out inside its own territory.

This is what makes this form of confrontation particularly appealing to its opponents. It allows them to maintain considerable pressure whilst avoiding the political and military costs of an open war.

It is this architecture that, in my opinion, is currently being reconstituted.

One year on from the sequence of events – «diplomatic detention – CIA-Mossad coordination – strike against Tehran» – which preceded the Twelve-Day War, several of the same factors are once again present: a deadlock in negotiations, a proxy war of attrition on the Jordanian, Saudi and Yemeni fronts, a military stalemate, persistent internal vulnerabilities and a discreet meeting between the heads of the American and Israeli intelligence services.

If the 2025 precedent is anything to go by, the next phase of the conflict might not be fought primarily on conventional battlefields.

It could take place behind the scenes: through intelligence, covert operations, sabotage and, once again, potentially through strikes targeting the most senior leaders of the Islamic Republic.