The tragedy of the Middle East. The hegemonic vacuum in a region searching for power

Hamza Meddeb, Research Fellow at MHK Carnegie Middle East Center

What if the central geopolitical problem facing the MENA region was not the absence of order, but rather the presence of a failing or incomplete hegemony?

In other words, and to quote the international relations professor John Mearsheimer, if the tragedy of the great powers (mainly regional in the Middle East), especially in a context synonymous with the absence of a global hegemon guaranteeing stability in the region, could only produce rivalries between states that are too powerful and well-equipped to accept one of them dominating the entire region, but none of them being powerful enough to ensure a semblance of long-term geopolitical stability.

Such a hypothesis deserves to be discussed all the more since it explains the recurring tensions and conflicts in this region by the configuration of the Middle Eastern system and its interactions with the international system, before even taking into account (although they are naturally important) the ideologies, the nature of the regimes, and the psychology of the various actors. The tragedy faced by the powers of the Middle East is the structural absence of a dominant power, and more so a hegemonic one, capable of rallying allegiances and concluding agreements and balances that would constitute a potentially more stable regional order. For years, debates on the instability of the region have continued without a conclusion, leading in some respects to a stalemate. The dominant trend in the West increasingly reflects a sense of resignation, considering the Middle East as a lost cause.

Restrained distribution of power and revisionist appetites

Too powerful to be definitively subdued, but not powerful enough to subjugate their adversaries, each country could, in theory, fulfill the role of a regional power thanks to sufficient material and/or ideological capabilities (Iran, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United States, etc.). They find themselves in a situation where the distribution of power and revisionist appetites are not satisfying everyone in a systematic manner, and where the impossibility of settling for the status quo engenders chronic instability and conflict that is no less systemic. In other words, the offensive realism we have just seen in almost ideal form in the conflict that has just ended (to use a somewhat inappropriate term) between the Israeli-American duo, based on maximizing short-term power at the immediate expense of rival power, seems for the time being the only geopolitical path for the region, unless we consider the conditions of a new, more stabilizing formula, the contours of which should be of interest to us all.

Once again, the conflict between Iran and Israel has sparked lively debates about the extreme instability of the Middle East. Analysts cite conflicting national interests, hostile political regimes, and divergent worldviews as the main causes of the current turmoil in the region. The recent «twelve-day war» between Tehran and the Tel Aviv-Washington alliance has taught us that no state, not even a small group of states, seems capable of ensuring the minimum conditions necessary for the political and strategic stability of the region.

Absence or failure of a regional hegemony

It is difficult to hope that the Middle East will achieve any semblance of stability (or disorder) in the coming years. Often described as the powder keg of the world, the region’s persistent instability cannot be attributed to a single cause; rather, a structural factor emerges: the absence or failure of a regional hegemony. Returning to the concept of hegemony in international relations offers a useful analytical angle for understanding why the Middle East remains plagued by very intense conflicts and why the risk of major interstate wars, both within and outside the region, continues to grow.

The main argument of this article is that the unique characteristics of the Middle East are primarily geopolitical. The absence of a hegemonic power, both at the local and international level, is a defining characteristic of the strategic and diplomatic order of the region. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, an international order is more likely to exist when a power has the political will to assume a leadership role and the ability to impose its will on others. By limiting destabilizing actors and maintaining a dominant structure that discourages conflict, such a hegemonic power maintains a certain level of order. This theory has historically influenced the interpretation of periods of relative stability, such as the Pax Britannica in the 19th century, when British dominance followed the post-Napoleonic settlement, or the Pax Americana after 1945, when the post-war international system was shaped by American power. In both of these situations, a power was considered capable and willing to maintain systemic order.

The Middle East, on the other hand, currently faces a structural void, as no state or coalition has the authority, the means, or the will to assume such a stabilizing role.

The root cause of the current instability in the region is this lack of hegemony. Debates about regional hegemony can apply to the Middle East, where states, faced with threats from their neighbors, seek to establish spheres of political and military influence to protect themselves. This creates a mimicry dynamic of offensive power, with each state vying to maximize its security in a regional system defined by rivalry. In the absence of a global hegemonic power capable of enforcing order, this dynamic generates structural instability and reinforces regional anarchy.

The end of Pax Americana

If there is a tragedy in the Middle East, it seems to stem from the inability of a state – whether internal or external to the region – to guarantee the minimum structures of stability as generally understood by the theorists of this concept. If we consider the three dimensions generally emphasized when considering the concept of hegemony: political, economic, and military, what lessons can be drawn from observing this region through this prism of hegemony, namely the potential absence/absence of a dominant power willing to assume a hegemonic role?

Examining Pax Americana, the regional order led by the United States in the Middle East, leads us to identify major lessons that it would be wise to keep in mind when examining stabilization possibilities for the coming decades.

First, the Middle East has never functioned as a cohesive security complex..

On the contrary, it remains a deeply fragmented region, marked by sectarian, ethnic, and ideological rivalries, as well as by the weakness of state institutions and the persistence of transnational conflicts led by intermediaries. These conditions have made the region inherently resistant to any form of external order imposed by a distant power like the United States.

Second, the United States has repeatedly failed to play a coherent and credible role as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Successive administrations have shown either little willingness or inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a central grievance that continues to undermine regional stability and alienate Arab public opinion. At the same time, Washington has struggled to contain or balance the competing ambitions of regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, each pursuing its own vision of influence and domination. The result has been a regional landscape in constant fragmentation, in which American leadership has lost its coherence and authority.

Thirdly, the incoherence of American foreign policy has eroded trust between allies and strengthened adversaries.

Episodes such as Obama’s abandonment of the red line in Syria and his pivot strategy, Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA negotiated by the Obama administration, and Biden’s adjustments without a long-term defense commitment to Gulf allies have signaled a strategic drift. These reversals have undermined the perception of the United States as a reliable guarantor of security.

In short, the general decline in American unipolarity, accelerated by the rise of China, Russia’s renewed confidence in the Middle East, and the emergence of a more multipolar world order, has eroded Washington’s ability to unilaterally shape the outcomes in the region. In the absence of a hegemonic power capable or willing to impose a new order, the end of Pax Americana has not ushered in a new stability, but a prolonged period of disorder, power struggle, and regional insecurity.

The United States is undoubtedly the power that has sought most to play the classic game of structural hegemony in the Middle East.

The United States has not really succeeded in this if we focus on the number of rival countries powerful enough to compromise the total Pax Americana in the Middle East, but insufficiently equipped and capable of shaping the region according to their interests. In other words, each potential regional hegemon would be characterized by a structural inability to achieve the optimal size and power necessary to ensure lasting stability, while being large enough to be a key factor in the actual or potential destabilization of all or part of the MENA region. It is as if this geopolitical zone never really experienced stabilization through a hegemonic state and went directly from the hegemonic stability of the Ottoman Empire, which prevailed for centuries, to the decline of the Sublime Porte and the assertion of the European colonial powers, which were in turn (to some extent) supplanted by the Soviet Union and (to a large extent) by the United States after the Second World War. This is where it seems to reside.

A fundamental geostrategic difference between the Middle East and the other regions of the world.

Latin America, despite countries opposed to Washington such as Venezuela or, to a lesser extent, Brazil under the presidency of Lula, is not (for the time being) seeking to become a nuclear power and cannot be considered a serious strategic adversary for Washington. Western Europe, for its part, did indeed agree to become an American protectorate after 1945; the attempts at independence of some countries (led by France) and the presence of a pro-Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe never succeeded in dividing the pro-American camp or seriously challenging the Atlantic alliance, which today shows for the first time signs of fragmentation due to the increasingly pronounced refusal of the current American leaders to assume their hegemonic responsibility over a continent that was at the heart of the bipolar confrontation but which weighs less today for President Trump and his advisers (their predecessors had, in fact, initiated this change in geopolitical priorities), than the Asia-Pacific region, where the global conflicts of tomorrow are looming.

What is the place of the Middle East in this complex web of past inheritances and current reconfigurations, and how to envisage possible options for stabilizing the region in the future, given that these options are currently more theoretical than practical? We argue here that forms of unfinished and unachievable hegemony have been interacting for several years to make the Middle East the chronic and structural zone of instability that it has become. The inability of global and regional actors to guarantee, or even sometimes to conceive, a form of hegemonic leadership capable of bringing at least some measure of stability highlights five different but partly complementary problems.

The Middle East after the Pax Americana: have the United States given up on their hegemony?

The first quarter of the 21st century clearly showed that Washington had largely failed to structure a durable hegemonic order in the Middle East. From the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to its ambivalent response to the Arab Spring, through its failure to counter the growing influence of Iran through the «pivot of resistance,» the American strategy had systematically failed. Even Israeli-American military operations targeting Iranian interests failed to bring about the regime change Netanyahu and his entourage openly desired, nor to end the Iranian nuclear program. At the same time, repeated opportunities to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the essential conditions for the stabilization of the region, have been relegated to the background since 2000. All of this highlights a fundamental contradiction: Washington’s attempt to impose its hegemony through military domination and regime change not only failed, but also proved counterproductive. A more effective path, based on diplomatic engagement and a balanced stance among regional actors, was possible, but it was systematically ignored.

The Abraham Accords: an attempt to reconfigure a regional hegemony by proxy

The Abraham Accords, launched in 2020 under the Trump administration, constituted an attempt to reconfigure this failing strategy by building a regional alliance that could act as a proxy hegemony. By normalizing relations between Israel and Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, in the expectation of other, sometimes more powerful states, the agreements aimed to merge Israel’s technological and military superiority with the financial and diplomatic weight of the Gulf monarchies. United by a common hostility towards Iran, this emerging bloc was intended not only to counter Tehran’s influence but also to fill the void left by the United States’ gradual withdrawal from the region. In essence, the agreements aimed to externalize the regional order to a coalition aligned with American interests, thus forming a kind of delegated hegemony.

The 2023 Gaza war radically changed the context

However, this project quickly encountered structural limitations. While the Biden administration was trying to extend the agreements, notably by courting Saudi Arabia, the Israeli military campaign, which caused many civilian casualties and caused massive destruction, sparked widespread indignation in the Arab world and undermined the legitimacy of the normalization efforts. Although the formal ties established under the agreements were maintained, supported by intelligence cooperation and economic interests, the momentum waned. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has lost all interest in joining the bloc after its rapprochement with Iran negotiated by China and in the absence of a security guarantee from the United States, all the more so as Iran’s regional position has weakened after the military defeat of Hezbollah and the fall of the Assad regime, which means that Iran no longer represents a direct threat to the interests of the Saudi monarchy. In this context, the Abraham Accords have endured as a diplomatic framework, but have failed to evolve into a true hegemonic alliance capable of anchoring the regional order. Rather, they have revealed how the influence of the United States has weakened and how the regional landscape has fragmented.

Ultimately, the era of American hegemony in the Middle East seems to be over.

A return to American primacy seems increasingly unlikely, as regional powers assert their autonomy and engage in a policy of hedging against the growing activity of new global powers in the region, as is usually the case with China. What awaits us is not a new stable order, but a contested and fluid equilibrium, defined less by external domination than by divergent interests, growing rivalries, and an uncertain American commitment.

The Middle East finds itself at a critical juncture and faces a fundamental challenge: how to overcome the current instability and build a regional order that reduces tensions, prevents future conflicts, and paves the way for lasting peace and stability? The answer is clear: the responsibility to end the conflicts in the region and establish stability lies with the major regional powers. However, competing visions, fluctuating gains and losses, and contradictory strategic agendas could ultimately perpetuate the cycle of attrition warfare.

Israel: An impossible hegemony?

While the American power was, on paper, the only force capable of combining the three traditional vectors of hegemony, Israel is trying to capitalize on its technological/scientific and military hegemony, two dimensions closely intertwined in the case of this country.

If October 7, 2023 undoubtedly marked the crisis of the Abraham Accords, which were supposed to represent, under the auspices of the United States, the cornerstone of the Israeli strategy aimed at diluting the Palestinian cause by trying to align the main Arab capitals that had not yet done so with Tel Aviv on the same strategic agenda, the pro-Western, anti-Iranian and anti-Islamic movements. Movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention the government of the Mullahs in Tehran, were by definition the main targets of an admitted and assumed regional restructuring policy. It’s almost as if Benjamin Netanyahu’s government’s strategy was inspired by and went beyond that of the Bush Jr. administration.

Israel’s current strategy is not based on ideals, but on the uncompromising use of brute and coercive power.

The Israeli approach of seeking «peace by force» is deeply problematic. Unlike the neoconservative project that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which revolved around the export of democracy and liberal values, it aims to crush resistance, particularly that of the Palestinian groups and the «axis of resistance» led by Iran, through overwhelming military dominance rather than through compromises. This force-based logic abandons any claim to an order based on rules or values. It seeks instead to unilaterally reshape the region through deterrence and the destruction of opposing forces, while ignoring the deeper political, historical, and humanitarian dimensions of the conflict. By rejecting any compromise and offering no viable political horizon, this strategy risks fueling cycles of violence and regional instability.

Unsurprisingly, the quest for hegemony by Israeli leaders can only succeed under two conditions.

1) First of all, this quest for Israeli hegemony, which is explicitly reflected in the regional geostrategic plans for the Middle East presented by the Israeli government under the name of the «New Order,» must presuppose the absence of a counter-hegemonic strategy on the part of the neighboring states, starting with those that have significant geopolitical weight.. The coexistence giving way to the will to control states or subnational entities (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Houthis) presupposes clearly the de facto return of a form of limited sovereignty (reminiscent of Brezhnev’s doctrine for the peoples« democracies in Eastern Europe during the Cold War) for many countries in the region, starting with Lebanon and Syria, where it is no longer surprising (although unjustifiable) to see Israel penetrate their territory and airspace under the pretext of preventing the accumulation of military resources in these two countries, even if this implies instrumentalizing certain minorities such as the Druze in the Levant and the Alawites in Syria in particular. But what is even more dangerous is that Israel’s hegemonic plan risks remaining largely uncompleted, or even turning against it, because it is explicitly resistant to any compromise. It is as if, to take a well-known sports metaphor, »only the cup and the final victory count«. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Israeli political analyst Yoni Ben Menachem declared during the »The Arabosts« debate organized by Zvi Yehezkeli on i24 that »Turkey is our next enemy«, adding that »after defeating Iran, if God wills, [the Israelis] will have to hold Qatar accountable for everything it did on October 7 (…) then [they] will move on to Turkey’. Since this is no more or less than a roadmap towards regional hegemony, the question that arises here is one of a possible counter-hegemonic reaction, and therefore of the acceptability of a domination of an almost exclusively military and oppressive nature. In this regard, it must be concluded that this type of domination, for structural reasons specific to each regional system where similar situations are observed today or in the past, has very rarely, if ever, been accompanied by a large-scale political normalization. In other words, it is difficult to see why the Israeli leaders of the late 20th century would succeed where the Americans failed, all the more so since many states, as we recently saw with Iran, but also Turkey and even Pakistan, will fight tooth and nail and possess an enormous capacity to destabilize the region.

Secondly, it is clear that behind Israel’s hegemonic agenda there is clearly a bet on the collapse of states, or even on generalized chaos, in which the Israeli leaders bet that they will be the only ones who can escape..

The desire to make the price of an Israeli hegemony unattainable by the structural weakening, or even the dismantling, of most of the neighboring states echoes a form of destructive and unacceptable hegemony. The disarmament of Hezbollah is already generating significant tensions in Lebanon and could push that bankrupt country to the brink of civil war. At the same time, the normalization with the new leaders in Damascus, combined with Israeli incursions into Syria and the instrumentalization of minority groups, risks further destabilizing Syria, placing the regime in an increasingly precarious position. And it is difficult to imagine how the various governments, not to mention the many companies that could rally to a revived nationalist sentiment fueled by an Israeli threat, as we saw with Iran during the «12-day war,» could adhere to such a project, especially if it is accompanied by the implementation of an ethnic cleansing in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the majority of Israeli political parties now explicitly desire, and even by the Israeli Jewish population.

Gulf States: Hegemony without responsibility?

Despite their significant financial resources, the Gulf countries remain militarily weak and, more importantly, are increasingly perceived as actors relying on cover, tactical calculations, and containment rather than on a strategic commitment to stabilize the region. Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been less motivated by a regional vision than by a deep sense of threat. Rather than responding to the uprisings with a commitment or support for regional transformation, the two states have adopted a containment strategy aimed at suppressing political change, curbing the rise of Islamist movements, and countering Iranian influence. Their interventions in the region were marked by coercive diplomacy, proxy wars, and selective engagement, all aimed at preserving their dominance while avoiding the responsibilities associated with regional leadership.

At the heart of their approach was a narrow geopolitical calculation. The Arab Spring was not perceived as a period of opportunity, but as a disruptive force capable of destabilizing monarchies and strengthening their ideological rivals. In response, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi aligned themselves with authoritarian regimes and military elites, from Egypt to Sudan, while devoting financial, political, and military resources to isolating Iran and weakening political Islam.

Financial diplomacy played a central role in this containment strategy.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided generous support to Egypt after the 2013 military coup, not to support the recovery or reforms, but to ensure the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood and maintain Cairo as the pro-Gulf axis. Similarly, they supported anti-Islamist factions in Libya and Sudan, considering these areas primarily as battlegrounds for ideological containment rather than as opportunities for regional stabilization or reconstruction.

In Yemen, the logic of fear and strategic cover was particularly pronounced. The intervention carried out by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2015, officially to restore legitimate governance, quickly turned into a prolonged humanitarian crisis. Despite the détente negotiated by China in 2023 between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which reduced cross-border hostilities, Gulf investments in post-conflict stabilization or structural solutions were limited. Withdrawal and de-escalation were prioritized over reconstruction or reconciliation, reflecting a more general reluctance to engage deeply in the region’s vulnerabilities.

The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates, although more assertive than that of Saudi Arabia, also reflected an inward-looking and transactional orientation.

His role as the driving force behind the 2020 Abraham Accords and the normalization with Israel aimed less at reshaping the regional dynamics in an inclusive way than at strengthening his own strategic leverage through alliances based on security and economic cooperation. His engagement in Syria and Sudan was not driven by a desire for regional reconstruction, but by the pursuit of geopolitical advantages and influence over its rivals, particularly Turkey and Iran.

Even the intra-GCC dynamics followed this logic of competition and containment. The blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, triggered by divergent positions on political Islam and relations with Iran, reflected a vision of regional politics based on exclusion and rivalry rather than coordination and integration.

The shock of October 7, 2023, and its consequences were perceived by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as an opportunity to accelerate the decline of political Islam and weaken Iran’s regional allies.

While rejoicing at the losses of Hezbollah and the constrained posture of Tehran, they also remained deeply concerned about possible reprisals and regional instability. This ambivalence was most clearly manifested in Saudi Arabia’s cautious stance towards regime change in Iran, which it considered potentially destabilizing for the entire Gulf.

Taken together, these developments highlight a defining characteristic of the foreign policies of the Gulf states: a preference for containment rather than engagement, and for risk reduction rather than regional leadership. As Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasingly turn inward, focusing on ambitious development plans, renegotiating their social contracts, and facing financial pressures related to global decarbonization, their foreign policies risk becoming even more defensive and transactional. Rather than shaping a new regional order, the GCC states seem determined to isolate themselves from its turmoil.

Iran: Hegemony without acceptance?

Iran represents the latest case of unfinished hegemony in this part of the world. It seems possible to say that the Islamic Republic of Iran has unaccepted hegemonic ambitions, especially for ideological reasons. If the strategic potential of this state is real, not to mention its possible accession to the status of a nuclear power in a few years, which would actually lead to the establishment of a strategic duopoly in the region with Israel (until other countries like Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia are able to follow the trend), the main obstacles to accepting a hegemonic focus on Tehran seem to come from the preservation of some of the original revolutionary ambitions that founded the current regime, among which stand out anti-Westernism and hostility towards American allies in the region, led by Israel and the Sunni monarchies.

In a certain way, due to the economic sanctions that have drained Iran dry and the antagonism that has prevailed for many years between the axis dominated by Tehran and the pro-American states, the Islamic Republic finds itself in a situation partly opposed to that of Saudi Arabia, which until recently wanted to enjoy a leadership without responsibility. Tehran seems to want to assume its role as a regional power, but it does not always have the economic means or the ability to make all its hegemonic ambitions acceptable to everyone.

Iran’s long-standing project to build a «axis of resistance» seems to have reached its limits. In the aftermath of the 12-day war, Tehran has suffered major strategic setbacks, losing key allies like Hezbollah and witnessing the collapse of its ally, the Assad regime in Syria. The use of a transnational network of Shia proxies, a project developed over more than forty years, not only failed to ensure lasting regional influence, but has also turned against it, leading to the consolidation of an anti-hegemonic bloc led by the Gulf countries and Israel and to growing isolation.

Iran’s most significant vulnerability lies within its borders. The regime is increasingly constrained by deep internal fragility, a chronic lack of legitimacy, and a declining economy.

Although external conflicts have sometimes led to a brief «rallying around the flag,» they have not resolved the structural crisis of the regime. The Iranian population, which is predominantly young, is increasingly detached from the ideological vision of the mullahs. Wilayat al-Faqih, considering the regime’s foreign policy as reckless adventurism that has led to difficulties, isolation, and economic stagnation.

These internal challenges are exacerbated by imminent structural changes. The global trend towards decarbonization and the inevitable transition to a post-petroleum era threaten Iran’s already fragile economy, which has long been paralyzed by international sanctions and poor governance. Unlike other states rich in resources, Iran has not been able to fully capitalize on its energy wealth, and the window of opportunity to do so is rapidly closing. Together, these internal and external constraints significantly limit Iran’s ability to project its power and support its regional ambitions.

Towards a hegemonic approach in the Middle East?

Is it conceivable that the Middle East will find itself in a situation synonymous with consent-based hegemony in the coming decades? While this seems unlikely in the short term, what conditions would be necessary for a form of hegemonic sharing to be established between the political, economic, and military powers?

The need for a sovereign and viable Palestinian State is more evident than ever, especially since October 2023. The region has lived for too long in the utopia of an imaginary solution that does not take into account the Palestinian people’s non-negotiable rights to self-determination. Today, it is clearer than ever that the only way to silence their legitimate aspirations will be to expel them and/or destroy them, sooner or later. In other words, Israel’s hegemonic agenda must be subject to serious compromises, or else it risks provoking in the coming years an anti-hegemonic alliance that can only take the form of a consolidation of the mobilization of several states in the region in favor of Palestine.

Saudi Arabia, the only country capable of rallying all the Gulf countries to its approach, is destined to assume increasingly important responsibilities in a structural and lasting way, rather than a temporary or cyclical one.

Regional reconstruction mechanisms can only be implemented with a strong push from Saudi Arabia, which means, for example, moving away from bilateral agreements such as those recently concluded between Washington and Riyadh. Instead, economic, environmental, and social cooperation involving all regional actors must be established. This is the only strategy that can break the cycle of seeking geopolitical rents that have benefited so many regimes for decades and put the needs of the populations ahead of those of certain leaders. Among the most visible cases of geopolitical rentierism today are Egypt, which was forced to cede some of its islands to certain oil-rich monarchies, such as the United Arab Emirates, which are interested in financial guarantees in cash given the growing debt of the Egyptian regime over the decades. The need to ensure the stability of the latter prevents neighboring states from abandoning it to its fate. In this regard, the countries of ASEAN constitute an interesting example of regional cooperation that does not necessarily rely on geopolitical alignment, and which could serve as inspiration for the states of the Middle East.

Iran, for its part, must reconfigure itself as a powerful and influential nation-state

He is doing so due to his historical role in this part of the world (a role that is not necessarily destined to disappear, given the importance that Chinese elites attach to this country in their ambitions for global economic expansion), but stripped of the revolutionary utopian dimension that emerged after the Islamic Revolution.

Finally, in order to avoid any internal dynamics within the States that could compromise their stability, or even their unity, it is important to consider mechanisms that allow for the representation of the grievances of the peoples and social groups, thereby illustrating the fact that the construction of a minimal hegemony must involve political and symbolic dynamics that include all the components of the societies of the region.

In conclusion,

It seems that a formula of peace could emerge from a substantial overhaul of the various hegemonic balances that have failed one after another or continue to fail in this part of the world. While no one can of course envisage the establishment of significant stability in the entire Middle East in the short term, it seems, however, that a thorough reflection on the concept of hegemony and the various unfinished programs in this region could enable significant progress in terms of intellectual and political understanding. These unfinished hegemonic programs, if not quickly and profoundly modified, will continue to plunge the Middle East into the tragedy from which it has every interest in getting out as quickly as possible.

Mohamed-Ali Adraoui and