Emmanuel Macron, long-time champion of a European \u00abthird way\u00bb between Washington and Beijing, has had to implicitly acknowledge the limits of this ambition in the face of the accelerated fragmentation of the international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This development is part of a French tradition of constant questioning regarding its place in the world. Since the presidency of Val\u00e9ry Giscard d\u2019Estaing, who asserted as early as 1975 that France must accept its status as a second-tier power behind the superpowers, the debate has never ceased between proponents of autonomous national greatness and realists accepting the necessity of coalitions. Macron himself as recently as 2020 rejected the idea that France could conceive of itself as a \u00abmiddle power\", believing that the French people could not accept it. Yet Paris's current diplomatic practice bears a remarkable resemblance to what Giscard had theorised. It aims to become the leading voice of a group of powers: the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany, which follow the superpowers while preserving their autonomy of decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Le concept d’\u00ab autonomie strat\u00e9gique europ\u00e9enne \u00bb, marotte fran\u00e7aise depuis des d\u00e9cennies, a lui aussi subi une mue significative. Il ne s’agit plus tant pour Paris de construire une d\u00e9fense europ\u00e9enne vraiment ind\u00e9pendante des \u00c9tats-Unis, objectif irr\u00e9aliste \u00e0 court terme. Mais plut\u00f4t de d\u00e9velopper des capacit\u00e9s permettant aux Europ\u00e9ens d’agir seuls \u00ab quand c’est n\u00e9cessaire \u00bb. Selon une formule consacr\u00e9e et r\u00e9currente de la diplomatie fran\u00e7aise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cette nuance s\u00e9mantique traduit un pragmatisme accru. La France reconna\u00eet que le soutien am\u00e9ricain demeure essentiel pour atteindre ses objectifs politiques. Mais elle refuse de s’en remettre enti\u00e8rement \u00e0 Washington dont la fiabilit\u00e9 est d\u00e9sormais questionn\u00e9e.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
L’engagement fran\u00e7ais en Ukraine illustre parfaitement cette nouvelle approche. Conscients que leurs stocks militaires et leurs finances ne leur permettent pas de fournir autant d’armements que d’autres pays en proportion de leur PIB, les responsables fran\u00e7ais ont mis\u00e9 sur un autre levier. Celui de l’audace politique combin\u00e9e \u00e0 l’exp\u00e9rience militaire et \u00e0 la dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire. Macron s’est impos\u00e9 comme l’architecte d’une \u00ab coalition des volontaires \u00bb. Cette derni\u00e8re, r\u00e9unissant les pays europ\u00e9ens dispos\u00e9s \u00e0 aller au-del\u00e0 du consensus minimal de l’OTAN ou de l’Union europ\u00e9enne. L’initiative, annonc\u00e9e fin 2025, visait \u00e0 donner une dimension plus strat\u00e9gique au soutien occidental \u00e0 Kiev, au-del\u00e0 de la simple fourniture d’\u00e9quipements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This stance represents a notable shift from Paris's traditional caution regarding NATO's eastward enlargement. Jacques Chirac had criticised the idea of the Alliance expanding towards Georgia and Ukraine, fearing a deterioration in relations with Moscow. Macron himself, prior to the Russian invasion of February 2022, repeatedly called for dialogue with Vladimir Putin and warned against the humiliation of Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Le revirement est donc consid\u00e9rable : lors du forum Globsec de Bratislava en juin 2023, le pr\u00e9sident fran\u00e7ais d\u00e9clarait que les garanties offertes par le pass\u00e9 \u00e0 l’Ukraine et \u00e0 la G\u00e9orgie avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00ab bien trop faibles \u00bb. Il exprimait son souhait de voir la Su\u00e8de rejoindre l’Alliance et d\u00e9montrant ainsi une position favorable \u00e0 l’\u00e9largissement de l’OTAN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cette \u00e9volution s’explique par une lecture lucide du rapport de forces. La France seule ne peut peser face \u00e0 une Russie revancharde, soutenue tacitement par la Chine, ni face \u00e0 des \u00c9tats-Unis dont la politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re oscille au gr\u00e9 des alternances politiques. En revanche, en se positionnant comme le catalyseur des initiatives europ\u00e9ennes les plus ambitieuses, Paris peut d\u00e9multiplier son influence r\u00e9elle. Le pari consiste \u00e0 transformer un handicap, des moyens limit\u00e9s en atout. Une capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 f\u00e9d\u00e9rer et \u00e0 donner une coh\u00e9rence politique aux efforts dispers\u00e9s des partenaires europ\u00e9ens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite this sophisticated strategy, France is running up against persistent scepticism from several European partners. The very concept of strategic autonomy remains controversial. The public disagreement between Macron and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, then German Defence Minister, over the nature of transatlantic relations illustrated this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For many Central and Eastern European countries, any inclination towards emancipation from Washington appears as an existential threat in the face of Russia. Poland, the Baltic states and Romania systematically prioritise their ties with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The French position on the Western Balkans also reveals underlying tensions. Paris's blocking, in 2019, of the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, followed by the imposition of a new enlargement methodology, were perceived as proof of French disinterest or even hostility towards the European integration of the Balkan countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This stance, justified in Paris by legitimate concerns regarding the functioning of European institutions and the need for internal reforms prior to any further enlargement, seemingly contradicts the rhetoric of a strong and united Europe facing geopolitical challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The tax issue constitutes another major point of vulnerability. France cannot lay claim to European leadership in defence and foreign policy if it fails to clean up its budgetary situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The French public deficit, regularly above the Maastricht criteria, limits room for manoeuvre. It significantly influences military spending and undermines Paris's credibility. The political crisis that shook France in late 2024 and early 2025 further weakened its position. Domestic turbulence is not without effect on the geopolitics of Europe as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The future of France's standing will depend largely on the configuration of the post-American, or at least post-hegemonic, international order. If, as many anticipate, the world evolves towards a plurality of regional orders rather than a unified system dominated by a single superpower, middle powers will have increased leverage. They will no longer need to tie themselves entirely to a single hegemon as the post-World War II era required. Through the diversification of their partnerships, risk mitigation and hedging strategies, their support will become a matter of competition between great powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, the temptation for middle powers to compete with each other rather than cooperate will be strong. The saga of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which was meant to embody Franco-German defence cooperation, illustrates the difficulties of overcoming national agendas in favour of genuine European integration. Yet, in areas such as defence, intra-European cooperation must prevail if the continent's countries are to wield collective influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
La France dispose d’atouts singuliers pour naviguer dans cet environnement incertain. Son si\u00e8ge permanent au Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des Nations unies, sa force de dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire autonome, son r\u00e9seau diplomatique mondial, sa pr\u00e9sence militaire sur plusieurs continents gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 ses territoires d’outre-mer, et une industrie de d\u00e9fense performante sont \u00e0 prendre en consid\u00e9ration. Ces attributs lui conf\u00e8rent une l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 que peu de partenaires europ\u00e9ens peuvent revendiquer. Mais ils ne suffiront pas sans une capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 construire des coalitions durables. Ni m\u00eame \u00e0 incarner un projet europ\u00e9en qui d\u00e9passe les seuls int\u00e9r\u00eats fran\u00e7ais.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The pragmatism shown by Macron since 2025 suggests that Paris has learned the lessons of past failures. Rather than proclaiming a European sovereignty for which the means are lacking, France now appears to favour concrete progress with partners willing to commit, even if it means accepting a multi-speed Europe. This approach, less ambitious on paper, could prove more effective, particularly in a world where power is measured less by the ability to impose than by the ability to bring people together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Emmanuel Macron, long-time champion of a European \u00abthird way\u00bb between Washington and Beijing, has had to implicitly acknowledge the limits of this...<\/p>","protected":false},"author":31730,"featured_media":4506,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[635,605,4],"tags":[57,56],"class_list":["post-4505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-diplomatie","category-france","category-mis-en-avant","tag-diplomatie","tag-france"],"yoast_head":"\n