{"id":3915,"date":"2025-11-04T22:32:09","date_gmt":"2025-11-04T21:32:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.geopolitics.fr\/?p=3915"},"modified":"2025-11-04T22:32:14","modified_gmt":"2025-11-04T21:32:14","slug":"the-cost-of-the-non-maghreb-reconciliation-or-stagnation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.geopolitics.fr\/en\/2025\/11\/04\/le-cout-du-non-maghreb-reconcilation-ou-stagnation\/","title":{"rendered":"The cost of non-Maghreb: reconciliation or stagnation?"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-nbsp-le-sahara-occidental-fracture-geopolitique-et-defi-mediterraneen\">&nbsp;Western Sahara, geopolitical fracture and Mediterranean challenge<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Mediterranean remains a strategic crossroads where geopolitical rivalries, security issues, energy challenges and migratory pressures intertwine. At the heart of this zone of instability, the Maghrebi fracture acts as a structural fault line that weakens the southern shore precisely at a time when it is seeking to stabilise itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Western Sahara conflict, frozen for nearly half a century, is its most visible expression. Much more than a territorial dispute, it symbolises the deadlock of a regional integration that is nevertheless essential for the prosperity of the Maghreb and the balance of the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Since 1975, this territory has been a point of contention between Morocco \u2014 which controls the major part of it \u2014 and the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), backed by Algeria. Despite a fragile ceasefire and the presence of MINURSO, negotiations have never led to a lasting solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on 30 October 2025, which supports the Moroccan autonomy plan under sovereignty, marks a major diplomatic turning point. Fifty years after the start of the conflict, the <strong>\u00abcost of non-Maghreb\u00bb<\/strong> \u2014 economic, security and human \u2014 has reached an unsustainable level. Without political will on both sides, this divide will continue to weigh on the stability of the Maghreb and mortgage the future of the entire Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-le-cout-du-non-maghreb-un-potentiel-economique-et-humain-sacrifie\">The cost of non-Maghreb: a sacrificed economic and human potential<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-une-integration-economique-inachevee\">An unfinished economic integration<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The fragmentation of the Maghreb has a tangible cost: according to the World Bank, the \u00abnon-Maghreb\u00bb deprives the region of 13 to 16 billion dollars a year. This shortfall is the result of closed borders, the absence of cross-border infrastructure and paralysed regional value chains \u2014 a paradox in an area where geographical proximity should naturally foster trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">A glaring symbol of this deadlock is the border between Morocco and Algeria, which has been closed since 1994. Beyond its symbolic weight, it embodies the absence of a shared vision for economic integration, which is essential to compete with other regional blocs. The harmonisation of customs policies, trade standards and logistics networks remains a major challenge, keeping the region in a state of chronic underperformance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-une-transition-energetique-entravee\">A hindered energy transition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Maghreb conceals immense assets: abundant gas resources and an exceptional potential for renewable energies. Yet, for want of interconnections, its energy infrastructures remain fragmented and under-exploited. The Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline or LNG terminals are examples of this: their lack of coordination deprives the region of collective energy security and limits joint investments, notably in green hydrogen, solar and wind power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This compartmentalisation is all the more regrettable since Europe, in search of energy diversification, could find a strategic partner in the Maghreb. The lack of regional coordination thus hinders a dynamic that could have benefited both shores of the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-un-bilan-humain-et-social-preoccupant\">A worrying human and social toll<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The effects of the \u00abanti-Maghreb\u00bb extend beyond the economic sphere:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Tindouf camps<\/strong> thousands of Sahrawis have been living there for decades in persistent hardship, dependent on international aid and deprived of a stable future.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Migratory pressures<\/strong> Tunisia, on the front line, is suffering the consequences of a lack of regional cooperation. Sub-Saharan migration flows, which are poorly managed, are exacerbating social tensions and insecurity, while the Mediterranean remains the scene of human tragedies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Brain drain<\/strong> each year, thousands of young graduates leave North Africa for Europe or the Gulf, depriving the region of its human capital and worsening the skills shortage.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-une-cooperation-regionale-en-panne\">Stalled regional cooperation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), created to promote regional unity, remains paralyzed by divergences between member states, each prioritizing its national interests. For want of political will, strategic joint projects fail to materialize, depriving the Maghreb of any capacity to exert collective influence on the international stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-un-constat-urgent\">An urgent finding<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The \u00abcost of the non-Maghreb\u00bb is not limited to financial losses. It translates to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">missed economic opportunities,<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">unresolved social crises,<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">and a growing vulnerability to security and geopolitical challenges.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">While other regions of the world are strengthening their integration, the Maghreb remains trapped by its divisions. The challenge is now clear: to renew dialogue, move beyond rivalries and transform this fracture into a lever for shared development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-de-la-rivalite-regionale-aux-tensions-securitaires-en-mediterranee-un-equilibre-fragile\">From regional rivalry to security tensions in the Mediterranean: a fragile balance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-une-militarisation-croissante-et-ses-repercussions-regionales\">Increasing militarisation and its regional repercussions<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Persistent divisions in the Maghreb are fuelling a security escalation in which the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria occupies a central place. In recent years, the two countries have engaged in an arms race that goes beyond the regional framework to fit into global geostrategic logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Algeria has reinforced its military apparatus through the acquisition of advanced Russian equipment (Sukhoi Su-35s, negotiations regarding the Su-57), asserting a strengthened defensive posture. Morocco, for its part, is modernising its arsenal through strategic partnerships with the United States and Israel, and discussions for the acquisition of F-35s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This re-armament dynamic, coupled with active security diplomacy, increases the risk of escalation around Western Sahara, where the ceasefire supervised by MINURSO since 1991 remains fragile. The proliferation of border incidents makes this balance precarious and threatens to spill over bilateral borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-la-libye-foyer-d-instabilite-et-d-ingerences-exterieures\">Libya, a hotbed of instability and foreign interference<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Libyan crisis exacerbates this fragility. Divided between a government in Tripoli and rival forces in the East, Libya has become a theatre of foreign interference where mercenaries and arms trafficking are proliferating. This chaos fuels an indirect rivalry between Algiers and Rabat, each seeking to safeguard its own interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, the porosity of borders and the institutional weakness of Maghrebi states facilitate the entrenchment of transnational jihadist groups (AQIM, IS Sahel), which exploit security loopholes. These networks are extending their influence from the Sahel to the fringes of the Maghreb, further destabilising the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Tunisia, already facing an economic and migration crisis, is directly suffering from this widespread insecurity: pressure on its reception capacities, growing migratory flows and the persistent terrorist threat. Regional disorder thus hampers any attempt at concerted stabilisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-la-mediterranee-theatre-d-une-competition-geopolitique-pluripolaire\">The Mediterranean: theatre of a multipolar geopolitical competition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Maghrebi fragility is part of a Mediterranean region that has once again become an area of global competition. A strategic crossroads accounting for 25 % of maritime traffic and 30 % of oil trade, the Mediterranean basin attracts covetous eyes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">The <strong>United States<\/strong>, despite their pivot to the Indo-Pacific, maintain a significant military presence, guaranteeing their influence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Russia<\/strong>, taking advantage of regional tensions, is strengthening its foothold in Syria, Libya and the Sahel, establishing itself as an alternative balancing power.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>China<\/strong>, for its part, favours an economic approach \u2014 port investments, trade corridors \u2014 and is increasing its influence without any stated military ambitions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In this multipolar context, the stability of the Maghreb is becoming a central geopolitical issue. The ability of regional actors to overcome their rivalries will determine their capacity to meet the energy, security and migration challenges that condition the balance of the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-le-pivot-diplomatique-une-resolution-aux-lectures-contrastees\">The diplomatic pivot: a resolution with contrasting interpretations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-un-tournant-strategique-occidental\">A Western strategic turning point<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">On 30 October 2025, the Security Council adopted a landmark resolution \u2014 number 2797 \u2014 supporting the Moroccan autonomy plan under sovereignty. Backed by Western powers (the United States, France, the United Kingdom), this initiative marks a major turning point in the quest for a solution to a conflict frozen for over fifty years, redefining diplomatic balances in the Maghreb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This stance is grounded in a logic of realism: Morocco, which administers the major part of the territory, has since 2007 presented its autonomy plan as the most viable path towards a political solution. Moroccan diplomacy, backed by a network of alliances in sub-Saharan Africa and with Western powers, has successfully presented this project as a guarantee of stability and sustainable development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-des-lectures-divergentes-reflet-des-clivages-regionaux\">Divergent readings, reflecting regional divides<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Far from being consensual, this resolution revealed the persistent fracture lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">For the <strong>Morocco<\/strong><strong>,<\/strong> it represents a major diplomatic victory and the recognition of its stabilising role in the region.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">For <strong>Algeria<\/strong> and the <strong>Polisario Front<\/strong>, it constitutes a violation of the principle of self-determination and an implicit legitimisation of the Moroccan occupation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">L\u2019<strong>EU <\/strong>and the\u2019<strong>UN<\/strong>, for their part, are adopting a cautious stance, acknowledging the realities on the ground while reaffirming the need for a negotiated, inclusive solution in accordance with international law.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-entre-principe-et-realisme-un-equilibre-a-trouver\">Between principle and realism: a balance to be struck<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">At the heart of this debate lies the tension between the principle of self-determination of peoples and diplomatic realism, which prioritises regional stability. This complex equation illustrates the difficulty of reconciling historical justice with lasting peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Abstentionist powers, such as Russia and China, are adopting an ambiguous stance, refusing to align themselves openly whilst seeking to preserve their levers of influence in the Mediterranean. This strategic vagueness reflects the silent rivalry of the major powers in a highly competitive arena.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-vers-une-lecture-pragmatique-et-constructive\">Towards a pragmatic and constructive reading<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This diplomatic pivot calls for a measured approach: after half a century of inertia, the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict appears as an essential condition for the emergence of a stable Maghrebi and Mediterranean dynamic. The issue is no longer to choose between principle and realism, but to find a new balance \u2014 founded on dialogue and the pursuit of a lasting compromise \u2014 to transform this historical fracture into a lever for stability and shared prosperity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-vers-une-mediterranee-stable\">Towards a stable Mediterranean?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-deux-trajectoires-possibles-pour-le-sahara-occidental\">Two possible trajectories for Western Sahara<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The year 2025, marked by the Security Council resolution, opens a window of opportunity \u2014 but also of vulnerability \u2014 for Western Sahara. Two scenarios are clearly emerging:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Persistent inaction<\/strong> in the absence of diplomatic convergence, MINURSO risks remaining a mere observer, with no tangible progress towards peace. The conflict would remain frozen, perpetuating the \u00abcost of non-Maghreb\u00bb \u2014 economic blockages, security tensions, and the radicalisation of young Sahrawis. This status quo would undermine the credibility of international institutions and pose a risk of lasting escalation in the region.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>The phased rollout<\/strong> if strategic conditions are right, a resumption of direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, under UN auspices and with increased involvement from the African Union, could emerge. The gradual acceptance of the Moroccan autonomy plan, backed by robust guarantees for the political and cultural rights of the Sahrawis, would pave the way for a lasting settlement. The reopening of the Algerian-Moroccan borders would then constitute a strong signal of reconciliation, releasing currently stifled economic and diplomatic potential.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-recommandations-pour-un-maghreb-reconcilie\">Recommendations for a reconciled Maghreb<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>For Morocco<\/strong> turn the diplomatic victory into tangible momentum.<br>Implement credible autonomy, based on inclusive governance that respects human rights, while making the development of Western Sahara a lever for peace through structural projects \u2014 renewable energies, sustainable agriculture, integrated infrastructure.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>For Algeria<\/strong> move beyond the logic of confrontation to become a stabilising actor once again.<br>The reopening of the borders with Morocco must become a strategic priority, not only to revive the regional economy, but also to ease the security climate. A constructive stance would enable Algiers to assert its role as a political pillar within a renewed Maghrebi dynamic.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>For the UN and the international community<\/strong> strengthen the mediation and protection framework. MINURSO should evolve towards a proactive mandate of dialogue facilitation, accompanied by credible human rights monitoring mechanisms, in order to guarantee trust and transparency in the process.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-la-mediterranee-laboratoire-d-une-nouvelle-cooperation\">The Mediterranean, a laboratory for new cooperation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The stability of the Maghreb cannot be considered in isolation. It must be part of a rethought Euro-Mediterranean dynamic:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list has-medium-font-size\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>The Mediterranean Pact (2025)<\/strong>, initiated by the EU, could sustainably anchor the Maghreb in a logic of economic and social integration. Connectivity projects \u2014 transport, energy, digital \u2014 must be accelerated to create positive interdependencies and reduce tensions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">The <strong>5+5 Defence<\/strong>, bringing together European and Maghrebi countries, must be reinforced to counter hybrid threats, transnational terrorism and organised crime. Effective security cooperation would make the Mediterranean a model of shared stability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-un-equilibre-a-construire-reconciliation-ou-stagnation\">A balance to be built: reconciliation or stagnation?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Western Sahara can remain the symbol of an endless conflict or become the catalyst for historic reconciliation. Everything will depend on the actors' ability to combine:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>realism<\/strong>, acknowledging power balances; ;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>inclusivity<\/strong>, while guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Sahrawis; ;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">and <strong>regional cooperation<\/strong>, by focusing on gradual economic and security integration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The Mediterranean will only recover its vocation for peace and prosperity if Western Sahara ceases to be a division and becomes a bridge. The coming years will be decisive in determining whether the region chooses stagnation or dares to reconcile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-le-sahara-occidental-miracle-ou-mirage-mediterraneen\">Western Sahara: Mediterranean miracle or mirage?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Western Sahara is not merely a frozen territorial conflict; it has become <strong>the trial of truth for the Maghreb and the Mediterranean<\/strong>. Will we be able to transform this historic division into a lever for stability, or will we allow this crisis to mortgage the future of an entire region? The stakes now go beyond borders: it is a question of whether regional and international actors will know how to place <strong>the imperative for peace above rivalries<\/strong><strong>,<\/strong> or whether the logic of blocs will continue to fuel division and instability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">A sustainable solution cannot be limited to a fleeting diplomatic victory; it must serve as <strong>foundation for a Maghrebi refoundation<\/strong>, capable of unlocking the geopolitical, economic and human potential of a region in search of coherence.<br><br>Imagine a united Maghreb, from Tangier to Tripoli \u2014 <strong>a Mediterranean pole of equilibrium, a crossroads for flourishing trade, a multi-sectoral cooperation force<\/strong>. This is not a utopia: it is a strategic necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">To achieve this, we must dare to be bold:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Transform the autonomy plan<\/strong> into inclusive governance, guaranteeing the Sahrawis their rights through transparent and credible mechanisms; ;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Reopen the borders<\/strong> not as a symbol, but as <strong>the founding act<\/strong> of a new era of economic and security cooperation; ;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Convenvene a Maghrebi conference<\/strong> under the aegis of the African Union, bringing together Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya and Sahrawi representatives, in order to define a joint roadmap. Backed by its pan-African legitimacy and its experience in mediation, the AU would provide the neutral and structuring framework necessary to overcome historical blockages.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The challenge is immense, but <strong>the stakes are even higher<\/strong>to make Western Sahara no longer a scar, but <strong>a hyphen<\/strong>, where political realism and historical justice finally meet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The choice is now in our hands: <strong>perpetuate stagnation or write a new page in Maghrebi history<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong> The time for tactical calculations is over, but for strategic vision. For, in the end, <strong>Western Sahara will not only be the mirror of Mediterranean ambitions \u2014 it will be the ultimate arbiter.<\/strong><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;Western Sahara, geopolitical fracture and Mediterranean challenge. The Mediterranean remains a strategic crossroads where geopolitical rivalries, security issues, energy challenges... are intertwined.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":103,"featured_media":3916,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[5,4],"tags":[124],"class_list":["post-3915","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-international","category-mis-en-avant","tag-maghreb"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v28.1 (Yoast SEO v28.8) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Le co\u00fbt du non-Maghreb : r\u00e9concilation ou stagnation ? | Geopolitics.fr<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"La r\u00e9solution 2797 du Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 marque un tournant diplomatique. 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